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Abstract 
This study investigates how subjective mortality expectations and heterogeneity in time and 
risk preferences affect the consumption and saving behavior of the elderly. Previous studies 
find  that  the  large  wealth  disparities  observed  among  the  elderly  cannot  be  explained  by 
differences  in  preferences.  In  contrast,  this  study  identifies  a  strong  relationship  between 
answers to survey questions about time and risk preferences and consumption and saving 
behaviors. This paper uses data on information about preferences and subjective mortality 
expectations from the Health and Retirement Study merged with detailed consumption data 
from two waves of the Consumption and Activities Mail Survey. The main results are: 1) 
consumption  and  saving  choices  vary  with  subjective  mortality  rates  in  a  way  that  is 
consistent with the life cycle model; 2) different answers to survey questions about time and 
risk preferences reflect differences in actual saving and consumption behavior; and 3) there is 
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1. Introduction 
This  study  investigates  how  subjective  mortality  expectations  and  heterogeneity  in 
time and risk preferences affect the consumption and saving behavior of the elderly. Whether 
or  not  such  preferences  are  heterogeneous  has  important  policy  implications,  e.g.  for 
analyzing the effects of tax incentives for saving  (Bernheim 2002). However, the role of 
heterogeneous preferences in explaining differences in saving and consumption behaviors is 
still  disputed.  Some  previous  studies  find  that  differences  in  preferences  play  no  role  in 
explaining wealth differences (Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg 2001, Dynan, Skinner, and 
Zeldes  2004).  In  contrast,  evidence  from  survey  questions  suggests  that  there  might  be 
substantial  differences  in  time  and  risk  preferences  between  individuals  (Barsky,  Juster, 
Kimball and Shapiro 1997, Harrison, Lau and Williams 2002, Kapteyn and Teppa 2003). 
Though, it is not a priori clear how answers to survey questions relate to actual intertemporal 
consumption choices
1. This study identifies a strong relationship between answers to survey 
questions about time and risk preferences and saving and consumption behavior.  
The  lifecycle  model,  which  goes  back  to  the  pioneering  work  of  Modigliani  and 
Brumberg  (1954)  and  Yaari  (1965),  predicts  a  specific  relationship  between  consumption 
growth, subjective mortality expectations and time and risk preference parameters. At the core 
of  the  lifecycle  model  is  the  idea  that  forward  looking  agents  hold  the  ex-ante  expected 
marginal  utility  from  consumption  constant  across  periods.  This  implies  that  agents  with 
higher subjective mortality rates should allocate less money for future as opposed to present 
consumption, because they are less likely to benefit from it. Therefore, the growth rate of 
consumption  should  be  lower  (or  the  decline  in  consumption  faster)  for  individuals  with 
higher subjective mortality rates. The magnitude of this effect will depend on agents’ risk 
aversion.  More  risk-averse  agents  are  less  willing  to  accept  fluctuations  in  consumption. 
Further, agents with  a  higher discount  factor of future consumption should allocate more 
                                                 
1 The study by Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002) links answers to survey questions to real monetary rewards.    4 
funds to present consumption, which implies that the growth rate of consumption will be 
lower.  
The restrictions imposed by the lifecycle model allow the estimation of time discount 
rates and risk aversion parameters from observed consumption and saving choices. I estimate 
Euler equations that relate consumption growth to subjective mortality rates and the risk of 
medical expenses. Including the risk of medical expenses allows for a precautionary savings 
motive. I control for agents that are credit constrained or buffer-stock savers. The data I use 
merge information about preferences and subjective mortality expectations from the Health 
and Retirement Study with detailed consumption data from two waves of the Consumption 
and  Activities  Mail  Survey.  The  combination  of  subjective  mortality  rates,  detailed 
consumption data, and answers to survey information about time and risk preferences allow a 
new approach to identifying heterogeneous preference parameters.  
Several  previous  studies  examine  the  effect  of  life  table  mortality  rates  on 
consumption  and  saving  behaviors  (Skinner  1985,  Hurd  1989,  Palumbo  1999,  Bloom, 
Canning,  and  Graham  2003,  De  Nardi,  French,  and  Jones  2005).  However,  individual 
mortality probabilities differ from life table mortality rates. If differences between individual 
mortality probabilities and life table mortality rates are correlated with other determinants of 
consumption choice, such as time preferences and risk aversion, then estimates using life table 
mortality rates might lead to biased estimation results
2. For example, smokers tend to have 
higher  mortality  probabilities  than  non-smokers,  and  they  also  tend  to  differ  in  their  risk 
aversion and time preferences (Khwaja, Sloan, and Salm 2006). An alternative to using life 
table mortality rates is to use subjective mortality expectations. Previous studies find that 
subjective mortality probabilities vary with known predictors of mortality such as smoking, 
income, and education, and are on average remarkably good predictors of actual mortality 
                                                 
2 Skinner (1985) and DeNardi, French and Jones (2005) adjust mortality rates for occupation and wealth, 
respectively.   5 
(Hamermesh 1985, Hurd and McGarry 1995, 2002, Smith, Taylor, and Sloan  2001, Khwaja, 
Sloan, and Chung 2005)
3. Gan, Gong, Hurd, and McFadden (2004) use subjective mortality 
probabilities to estimate a structural model of saving and consumption that includes a bequest 
motive.  They  find  that  estimates  using  subjective  expectations  fit  the  data  better  than 
estimates  that  are  based  on  life  table  mortalities.  In  contrast  to  their  study,  I  include  a 
precautionary savings motive for health care expenditures and use detailed consumption data 
instead of predicting wealth levels. 
The shortage of high quality longitudinal consumption data has long presented a major 
difficulty for studying saving and consumption behavior. Many previous studies either use 
information on food consumption only, which  is included in some commonly used panel 
datasets, or calculate consumption from differences in wealth levels between periods (see 
survey by Lusardi and Browning 1996). However, food consumption might not be a good 
proxy for overall consumption (Attanasio and Weber 1995, Lusardi and Browning 1996), and 
changes in assets can be an imprecise measure of consumption. Other studies create pseudo-
panels from cross-sectional data (Parker and Preston 2005). In this study I employ a measure 
of  annual  consumption  spending  on  nondurable  goods  based  on  two  waves  of  the 
Consumption and Activities Mail Survey, which was administered to a sub-sample of the 
Health and Retirement Study population in 2001 and 2003.  
In  order  to  examine  whether  varying  saving  and  consumption  behavior  can  be 
explained by heterogeneous time and risk preferences, it is necessary to identify individuals or 
groups of individuals with different preferences. Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2004) examine 
whether  preferences  vary  by  income  groups.  They  find  that  for  working  age  households 
saving rates increase with higher permanent income, but argue that higher saving rates of high 
income  households  cannot  be  explained  by  lower  time  discount  rates  and  risk  aversion, 
because in retirement the wealth of well to do households doesn’t decline at a faster rate than 
                                                 
3Subjective probabilities also tend to be good predictors of events other than mortality (survey by Manski 2004).      6 
the wealth of poorer older households. However, an alternative explanation consistent with 
heterogeneous preferences could be that life expectancy is higher for wealthy individuals, 
which  could  justify  slow  rates  of  dis-saving  in  retirement  among  the  wealthy.  Bernheim, 
Skinner  and  Weinberg  (2001)  examine  whether  preferences  vary  by  wealth  levels.    They 
argue  that  time  preferences,  subjective  mortality  rates,  and  risk  aversion  play  no  role  in 
determining the distribution of retirement savings, because growth rates for food consumption 
do  not  vary  systematically  with  wealth  around  retirement.  However,  changes  in  food 
consumption might not be a good measure of changes in overall consumption. Also, in the 
presence of a precautionary savings motive for medical expenditures the lifecycle model does 
not necessarily predict that wealthier households with low time discount factors have higher 
consumption growth rates than poorer households with high time discount factors, because the 
effect of lower time discount rates could be offset by the effect of a stronger precautionary 
savings  motive  for  poorer  households.  In  this  study  I  examine  whether  consumption  and 
saving  behaviors  vary  with  the  answers  to  survey  question  on  time  and  risk  preferences. 
Barsky, Juster, Kimball and Shapiro (1997) and Kapteyn and Petta (2003) find that there is 
substantial  variation  in  stated  time  and  risk  preferences,  and  Harrison,  Lau  and  Williams 
(2002) find that answers to questions on time preferences are also heterogeneous if they are 
tied to real monetary rewards. To the author’s knowledge, this is the first study that matches 
the answers to survey questions on time and risk preferences with detailed consumption data 
in order to study the effect of heterogeneous preferences on consumption behaviors. 
The  main  results  are:  First,  consumption  and  saving  choices  vary  with  subjective 
mortality rates and reported time and risk preferences in a way that is consistent with the life 
cycle model. This finding contributes to a debate about whether the saving and consumption 
behaviors of the elderly are consistent with the life-cycle model. Some studies cite the lack of 
(or slow pace of) asset decumulation among the elderly as evidence against the life-cycle 
model (Hurd 1987, Hurd 1990, Attanasio and Hoynes 2000). Whether consumption growth   7 
decreases with higher mortality expectations is an alternative and more direct test of the life-
cycle model. Second, consumption growth varies with reported preferences in the predicted 
way. This finding suggests that different answers to survey questions about time and risk 
preferences  reflect  differences  in  actual  saving  and  consumption  behavior,  and  it  adds 
credibility to studies that use survey questions to gain knowledge of preferences. Third, there 
is substantial heterogeneity in the estimated time discount rates and risk aversion parameters. 
Utility parameters for time and risk preferences are a critical input in analysis based on life 
cycle  models,  which  are  routinely  used  for  a  wide  range  of  applications.  Heterogeneous 
preferences can have implications e.g. for examining the effects of tax incentives on saving or 
for explaining the wealth distribution.   
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents and 
discusses  the  identification  strategy.  The  results  are  presented  in  section  4.  Section  5 
concludes. 
 
2. Data description  
This study combines data from waves five and six of the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS), which were collected in 2000 and 2002, with information from the Consumption and 
Activities Mail Survey (CAMS) from 2001 and 2003. The HRS is a national panel study, 
which  started  in  1992  and  was  repeated  biannually.  The  sample  in  the  year  2000  survey 
includes about 19,600 respondents. These include members of the original HRS cohort born 
between 1931 and 1941, as well as later additions to the HRS sample, which were drawn from 
those born before 1931 (AHEAD and CODA cohorts) and individuals born between 1942 and 
1947  (War  Baby  cohort).  The  HRS  also  includes  the  spouses  of  all  sample  participants 
regardless of age. The HRS contains detailed information on health, income, assets, future 
expectations, as well as questions about attitudes and preferences. One shortcoming of the 
HRS as well as of other large U.S. household panel surveys is the lack of detailed information   8 
about household consumption. The only information about household consumption included 
in  the  main  HRS  survey  concerns  at  home  and  out  of  home  food  consumption.  The 
Consumption  and  Activities  Mail  Survey  remedies  this  deficit  and  includes  detailed 
information on household consumption spending, and also spending intentions. A description 
of  the  CAMS  survey  is  provided  in  Butrica,  Goldwin,  and  Johnson  (2005).  The  CAMS 
questionnaire  was  sent  to  initially  5,000  households  randomly  drawn  from  the  HRS 
population. 2,989 households completed both surveys in 2001 and 2003. I restrict the sample 
to persons who are above age 65 (because there are changes in consumption patterns around 
retirement,  Aguar  and  Hurst  2005),  and  to  single  person  households,  which  allows 
disregarding difficulties in modeling intra-household decision making. After excluding some 
observations with missing variables the estimation sample consists of 476 observations. The 
baseline regression, which also excludes constrained agents and some respondents with focal 
answers about mortality expectations from the sample, includes 371 observations.  
The  dependent  variable  is  the  real  annual  percentage  change  in  consumption.  I 
measure consumption as the sum of annual expenditures on nondurable goods, which include 
spending  on  food,  gas,  clothing,  dining  out,  vacations,  tickets  to  events,  and  hobbies.  I 
calculate  the  yearly  percentage  change  in  consumption  by  taking  the  difference  of  the 
logarithms of consumption spending on nondurable goods in 2003 and 2001, divided by two. 
I compute real consumption growth rates by adjusting for the increase of the consumer price 
index  for  all  goods.  I  exclude  purchases  of  durable  goods  such  as  cars.  Expenditures  on 
durable goods do not coincide with the consumption flows received from them. Adjusting 
consumption  flows  from  durable  goods  is  also  costly  for  consumers.  The  consumption 
variable also excludes medical expenditures. Medical care does typically not provide direct 
utility to consumers, but is an investment in health. For studying changes in consumption, the 
change in the consumption of nondurable goods is one of the best available measures (Lusardi 
and  Browning  1996).  Alternatively  I  also  include  a  specification  that  is  based  on  food   9 
consumption only. Table 1 shows that the annual real consumption growth for nondurable 
goods in the estimation sample is negative, while the expenditure on food consumption is 
growing. 
Among the explanatory variables in my estimation is the subjective annual mortality 
rate. The HRS does not directly ask about subjective mortality probabilities in the following 
year, but it includes questions about subjective longevity probabilities. Specifically, the HRS 
asks about the percent chance that a respondent would live to age A, where A depends on the 
respondent’s current age and is between 11 and 15 years above the respondent’s current age. 
Previous studies have shown that subjective longevity probabilities are in general very good 
predictors of actual longevity (Hurd and McGarry 1995, 2002, Smith, Taylor, and Sloan 2001, 
and Khwaja, Sloan, and Chung 2005). However, the high frequency of focal answers raises 
concerns about the validity of self-reported longevity probabilities. In the 2000 HRS survey, 
9.5% of respondents stated that their subjective longevity probability  was 0% and 10.7% 
stated  it  was  100%.  Gan,  Hurd,  and  McFadden  (2003)  suggest  a  procedure  that  involves 
adjusting stated probabilities based on actual mortality in the two years following the survey. I 
decided  against  correcting  stated  probabilities,  because  even  somewhat  unrealistic 
expectations might still be what agents base their decision on. 
For calculating subjective mortality rates, I follow Gan, Hurd, and McFadden  (2003) 
in assuming that subjective annual mortality rates mi,t are the product of  annual life-table 
mortality rates m0,t and an individual specific individual mortality factor ξi: 
t o i t i m m , , ξ =                                               (1) 
I use life table mortality  rates for 1998 separately for men and women which are 
provided by the Center for Disease Control (http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvsr48_18.pdf ). Given 
equation (1) the subjective probability si,a,A of individual i to survive from age a to age A can 
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However,  one  shortcoming  of  this  approach  is  that  it  does  not  allow  calculating 
subjective annual mortality probabilities for persons who state that their subjective longevity 
probability is zero. It is not clear what the subjective survival probability for the next year 
should  be  for  agents  who  don’t  expect  to  live  for  another  11  to  15  years.  I  employ  two 
alternative approaches to this problem. One approach is to change the answer from 0% to 1% 
(similar to Khwaja, Sloan, and Chung. 2005). The other approach is to omit the observations 
with  a  subjective  longevity  probability  of  0%.  I  also  test  if  estimation  results  change  if 
observations with a subjective longevity expectation of 100% are excluded. The distribution 
of the subjective annual mortality rates and the life table annual mortality rates in the baseline 
estimation  sample  is  shown  in  Figure  1.  The  mean  subjective  mortality  rate  is  3.6%  as 
compared  to  4.3%  for  life  table  mortality  rates.  The  standard  deviation  for  subjective 
mortality rates is 3.7%, and it is 2.9% for life table mortality rates.   
I use financial planning horizon as a proxy variable for time preferences. Specifically, 
I identify respondents with varying time preferences by the answer to the following question:  
“In deciding how much of their (family) income to spend or save, people are likely to think 
about different financial planning periods. In planning your saving and spending, which of the 
following time periods is most important to you?” Possible answers include the next few 
months, the next year, the next few years, the next 5-10 years and longer than 10 years. I 
divide the sample in three groups with financial planning horizon up to one year (n = 130, 
35% of baseline sample), up to five years (n = 125, 33.6% of sample), and longer (n = 116, 
31.4% of sample).  This question was asked to all HRS respondents in wave 1, and to varying   11 
sub-samples of the HRS population in waves 4, and 5. I use the latest available answer and 
impute answers for some respondents who were never asked about their financial planning 
horizon.    I  use  IVEware  imputation  and  variance  estimation  software,  which  follows  a 
sequential regression imputation method described in Ragunathan, Lepkowski, van Hoewyk, 
and Solenberger (2001). Table 2 shows descriptive statistics by financial planning horizon. 
The average growth rates of consumption vary widely from -12% for persons with a short 
financial planning horizon to 3.4% for persons with a long financial planning horizon. This 
pattern agrees with prior expectations. All other things being equal, persons with lower time 
discount rate should experience faster consumption growth, and a longer financial planning 
horizon should correspond with lower time discount rates. Persons with a longer financial 
planning horizon are on average younger and face lower subjective mortality rates. They are 
also better educated, and have higher wealth and income.  
I  identify  respondents  with  varying  risk  tolerance  by  the  answer  to  the  following 
question: “Your doctor recommends that you move because of allergies, and you have to 
choose between two possible jobs. The first would guarantee your current total family income 
for life. The second is possibly better paying, but the income is also less certain. There is a 50-
50 chance the second job would double your total lifetime income and a 50-50 chance that it 
would cut it by 20%. Which job would you take - the first job or the second job?”  Depending 
on the answer to this question, I divide the sample in two groups with high risk aversion (n = 
254, 68.4% of baseline sample), and with lower risk aversion (n = 127, 31.6% of sample). 
This question was asked to the same samples as the question on financial planning horizon 
defined above. I use the latest available answer, and I impute some missing answers. Table 3 
shows descriptive statistics by stated risk aversion. The average consumption growth rate is - 
1.8% for persons with low risk aversion and -7.8% for persons with higher risk aversion. On 
average, more risk adverse persons also have higher incomes, while more risk tolerant persons 
have more assets, higher education, and are more likely to be male.    12 
Further variables employed in the analysis are total household income, which includes 
social security, employer pensions, and capital income, and total household net wealth, which 
includes net financial wealth, housing equity, the net value of businesses, and the value of 
vehicles. A binary variable whether or not the respondent is in good health is set to one if self 
reported overall health is excellent, very good, or good, and is set to zero if self reported 
health is fair or poor. The number of limitations in activities of daily living ranges from 0 to 6, 
and represents whether respondents are able to independently walk, dress, bathe, eat, get into 
bed, and use the toilet. 
 
3 Identification Strategy  
My identification strategy follows directly from a standard life-cycle model. Consider 
a  single  retired  agent  who  chooses  consumption  and  saving  in  each  period  in  order  to 
maximize  expected  lifetime  utility.  I  assume  that  utility  is  additively  separable  between 
periods, and that future utility is discounted with factor βi, which can vary between agents. 
The subjective probability of survival from age t to age j is denoted as si,t,j  (with j ≥ t). Then 
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where T is the maximum age a person can live to, and Et is the expectations operator 
based on information in period t. I further assume that within-period-utility is given by a 















where γi is the parameter of relative risk aversion, which can vary between agents. The 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is given by 1/ γi, the inverse of risk aversion. In each   13 
period  agents  receive  income  yt  from  Social  Security  and  pensions.  This  income  is  non-
stochastic. Social security payments increase with inflation (cost of living adjustment), and 
are constant in real terms. Agents face uncertain out of pocket medical expenditures νt in each 
period.  Out  of  pocket  medical  expenditures  are  treated  as  exogenous  and  are  not  part  of 
consumption. I assume that there is one asset that yields a risk free real return of Rt between 
periods.  Assets  in  period  t+1,  at+1,  are  determined  by  the  following  asset  accumulation 
equation: 
) ( 1 t t t t t t c y a R a ν − − + = +   
Social Security entitlements cannot be used as collateral for loans and it is difficult to 
borrow against employer pensions.  This credit constraint imposes the following restriction on 
consumption: 
t t t t y a c ν − + ≤                                               (2) 
If the credit constraint is not binding, then the first order condition requires that the marginal 
utility  from  consumption  in  period  t  is  equal  to  the  expected  marginal  utility  from 
consumption expenditure in period t+1:  
)] ( [ ) ( 1 1 , , + + ′ = ′ t t t t i i t t c u E s R c u β                                          (3) 
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Uncertainty about future consumption derives from stochastic out of pocket medical 
expenses.  Under  the  assumption  that  consumption  changes  are  log-normally  distributed, 
equation (4) can be transformed into the following Euler equation: 
) ln ( ) 2 / ( ) ( / 1 ) ln ( 1 , 1 + + ∆ + − − = ∆ t t i t i i t i t t c Var m r c E γ δ γ                       (5)   14 
where  ln ct+1 = ln ct+1 – ln ct is the growth rate of consumption, rt = ln Rt  is the real 
interest rate at time t, δi = - ln βi is the time discount rate for agent i, and mi,t = - ln si,t,t+1, the 
subjective  mortality  rate  of  agent  i  in  period  t.  Equation  (5)  postulates  that  expected 
consumption growth should increase with higher real interest rates and decrease with higher 
time discount rates and higher mortality rates, and that these effects should be smaller for 
more risk averse agents. Expected consumption growth should increase with a higher variance 
of consumption growth. An Euler equation very similar to equation (5) can also be derived 
without the assumption of log-normally distributed consumption growth rates from a 2
nd order 
Taylor approximation of equation (4) (Carroll 2001, Ludvigson and Paxson 2001).   
The empirical model follows closely from equation (5). I estimate the following least 
squares regression: 
  t i t i t i t i h a m a a c , , 2 , 1 0 1 , ln ε + + + = ∆ +                        (6) 
where a0, a1, and a2 are regression coefficients, mi,t is the subjective annual mortality 
rate, and hi,t is the variance of out of pocket medical expenditures for agent i at time t. εi,t is an 
error term, which reflects health cost shocks and measurement errors of consumption growth. 
Consumption growth is expected to be lower for agents with higher subjective mortality rates, 
because  such  agents  are  expected  to  consume  more  now  and  less  in  future  periods. 
Consumption  growth  is  expected  to  be  higher  for  individuals  with  a  higher  variance  of 
expected  future  out-of-pocket  medical  expenditures,  because  such  agents  have  a  stronger 
precautionary savings motive.      
Utility  parameters  γ  and  δ  can  be  calculated  from  the  coefficients  in  regression 
equation (6). The estimated relative risk aversion parameter can be computed as  
1 / 1 a − = γ                            (7)   15 
I estimate relative risk aversion parameters, separately for the full sample and for sub-
samples, to which respondents are assigned according to their answer to a survey question 
about the willingness to accept lifetime income gambles. This approach allows examining, 
whether and how much relative risk aversion varies across agents.  
If the real interest rate rt is known, then the time discount rate can be derived from: 
t r a a + = 1 0 / δ                                     (8) 
I  examine  how  time  discount  rates  vary  with  the  answer  to  a  survey  question  on 
financial planning horizon. Financial planning horizon stands as a proxy variable for the time 
discount rate, which cannot be directly observed. I expect that agents with longer financial 
planning horizons also have lower time discount rates.  
I calculate the individual-specific risk of health costs based on out of pocket medical 
expenditures  of  HRS  respondents  in  the  two  years  preceding  the  2002  interview.  Out  of 
pocket expenditures, oopi,t , include hospital costs, nursing home costs, doctor visit costs, 
dentist costs, outpatient surgery costs, average monthly prescription drug costs, home health 
care,  and  the  cost  of  special  facilities.  I  calculate  the  variance  of  out  of  pocket  medical 
expenditures by the following two stage procedure. The first stage regression equation is: 
t i t i t i x b b oop , , 1 0 1 , η + + = +  
where xi,t is a vector of covariates from the 2000 HRS survey. Covariates include out 
of pocket medical expenditures in previous waves, information on health insurance, age, years 
of education, gender, self reported health of good or better, total financial wealth, and total 
household  income,  the  number  of  limitations  in  activities  of  daily  living,  and  previous 
diagnoses  of  diabetes,  cancer,  lung  diseases,  heart  diseases,  stroke,  and  psychological 
disorders.  The  second  stage  estimation  regresses  the  squared  error  term  of  the  first  stage 
regression on the same covariates as above:   16 
t i t i t i x c c , , 1 0
2
, ˆ µ η + + =    
The estimated variance of medical expenditure, ĥi,t, is then computed by: 
t i t i x c c h , 1 0 , ˆ ˆ ˆ + =  
This approach allows identifying agents with varying risk of medical expenditures. ĥi,t 
is included in regression equation (6) as a proxy for overall consumption risk.  
However, there are several caveats in interpreting the results from regression equation 
(6). The first caveat concerns the validity of Euler equation estimates in the presence of credit 
constrained agents and buffer-stock savers. If the credit constraint in equation (2) binds, then 
the first order condition in equation (3) might not hold with equality, and utility parameters 
estimated from regression equation (6) are inconsistent. Carroll (1998, 2001) points out that a 
similar  argument  can  also  hold  for  households with  positive  wealth  who  are  buffer-stock 
savers.  Buffer-stock  savers  have  only  a  precautionary  savings  motive.  In  the  absence  of 
consumption  uncertainty  they  would  borrow  against  future  income.  In  a  simplified 
description,  buffer-stock  savers  always  hold  a  certain  target  wealth  as  insurance  against 
negative shocks and never exceed their target wealth. The consumption growth of buffer-
stock savers is not affected by changing mortality rates, which implies that in the presence of 
buffer-stock  savers  utility  parameters  estimated  from  equation  (6)  can  be  inconsistent. 
However, this is less of a concern for the elderly than for younger agents. Buffer stock savers 
are more likely to be individuals with a low wealth to income ratio and high income growth. 
In contrast, retirees tend to hold sizeable wealth in relation to their incomes, and the real 
income  of  retirees  is  often  stable.  I  identify  constrained  agents  using  the  answer  to  the 
following survey question about spending intentions of a windfall gain: ”Suppose next year 
you were to find your household with 20% more income than normal, what would you do 
with the extra income?” For the estimation of utility parameters I exclude all agents from the   17 
sample, who answer that they would spend the entire windfall gain. This leaves a sample of 
agents who are not credit constrained or buffer-stock savers.  
A  second  caveat  concerns  the  validity  of  the  financial  planning  horizon  as  proxy 
variable for the time discount rate. While it is plausible that agents with a lower time discount 
rate have a longer financial planning horizon, this is also likely to be true for people with 
higher wealth, income, or better health (Khwaja, Sloan, and Salm 2006). These factors are 
also determinants of subjective mortality rates. This could lead to biased estimates of time 
discount rates. In order to evaluate this potential problem I test, whether the estimation results 
are sensitive to the inclusion of additional variables for wealth, income, and health.  
Also, the variance of out of pocket medical expenditures is not a perfect proxy for 
consumption risk. The consumption of agents with little liquid wealth is likely to vary more 
with out of pocket medical expenditures than the consumption of agents with high financial 
wealth. Therefore, I estimate the effect of out of pocket medical cost variance separately for 
households with financial wealth above and below the median in my sample, and I examine if 
the coefficient estimates are sensitive to this change.   
A further caveat concerns the effect of ill health on consumption. The utility derived 
from  consumption  could  depend  on  agents’  health  (Viscusi  and  Evans  1990).  Both 
consumption capacities and needs are likely to be affected by ill health, while the risk of 
deteriorating health might increase with higher mortality rates. As a test for potential bias, I 
examine if consumption growth is linked to changes in the ability to perform activities of 
daily  living  (ADL’s),  and  whether  estimation  results  are  sensitive  to  the  inclusion  of  a 
variable that represents changes in ADL’s.  
The identification strategy discussed above does not explicitly account for a bequest 
motive. However, a bequest motive would affect the levels of consumption in all periods, but   18 
not  necessarily  the  changes  in  consumption.  Since  this  study  examines  changes  in 
consumption, the identification strategy can still be valid in the presence of a bequest motive. 
 
4 Results 
A. Estimating the variance of out of pocket medical expenses 
The variance of out of pocket medical expenditures is estimated in two stages, as 
described in the previous section. The first column of Table 4 shows the first stage regression 
results. Out of pocket medical expenditures in the two years before the year 2002 interview 
increase with previous out of pocket medical expenditures in the two years before the year 
2000 interview by $0.40 for every dollar of previous expenditures. They also increase with 
age (by $72 every year) and education level (by $155 for every additional year of schooling), 
and are lower for men (by $384) and for people whose self-reported health is good or better 
(by $621). All explanatory variables refer to the year 2000. Medical expenses are higher for 
agents with private health insurance (by $837) and lower for agents who receive Medicaid (by 
$2,045). Medical expenses for agents with employer health insurance and no health insurance 
are not significantly different from agents who are covered by Medicare only, which is the 
omitted health insurance category. Medical expenses also increase with a higher number of 
limitations in activities of daily living (by $701 for every additional limitation), and with 
previous diagnoses of cancer, heart diseases and stroke. There are no statistically significant 
effects of income, financial wealth, and previous diagnoses of diabetes, lung diseases, and 
psychological disorders. The second column of Table 4 shows the second stage estimation 
results with the squared residuals of the  first stage regression as dependent variable. The 
dependent  variable  is  scaled  down  by  a  factor  1,000,000.  The  variance  of  out  of  pocket 
medical expenditures increases with higher previous out of pocket medical expenditures. It is 
lower  for  individuals,  whose  self  reported  health  is  good  or  better.  In  order  to  increase   19 
efficiency, the variance of out of pocket medical expenditures is estimated based on the entire 
available HRS sample, which includes 17,095 observations. As an informal test of whether 
health cost risk as defined above is a good proxy for the variance of consumption growth, I 
calculated the correlation between health cost risk and the square of the deviation from the 
mean of consumption growth. For the baseline sample, the correlation coefficient is 0.086, 
which is significantly different from zero at the ten percent level. 
 
B. Baseline regression, spending intentions, food consumption 
Table  5  shows  estimation  results  for  Euler  equations  as  specified  in  the  empirical 
model in equation (6). The estimation sample includes all persons, who participated in both 
waves of the Consumption and Activities Mail Survey, and who were age 65 or older and 
lived in a single person household at the time of the year 2000 HRS interview. Persons with 
subjective longevity probabilities of zero are excluded from the sample (They are included in 
the estimation in column 4 of Table 6). The baseline regression in column 1 also excludes 
individuals from the sample who intend to immediately spend a windfall gain. The remaining 
sample includes 371 observations. The dependent variable is the growth rate of real annual 
consumption expenditures on nondurable goods. Consumption growth decreases with higher 
subjective mortality rates; an increase in the subjective mortality rate by 1% is associated with 
a consumption decline of 1.98% per annum.  This is consistent with consumption behavior 
predicted by the lifecycle model. Consumption growth also increases with the variance of out 
of pocket medical expenditures, which provides evidence for a precautionary savings motive. 
Column 2 shows estimation results for the same regression specification as in column 
1, but the sample is now restricted to 47 respondents who intend to immediately spend a 
windfall gain. As discussed above, consumption growth of credit constrained consumers and 
of buffer-stock savers should not depend on subjective mortality rates and time preferences.   20 
Indeed, I find none of the estimation coefficients is significantly different from zero. The 
effect of a 1% increase of the subjective mortality rate on consumption growth is now an 
increase of 0.19% per annum as opposed to a decline of 1.98% of for non-constrained agents 
in column 1. This result indicates that stated spending intentions from a survey question can 
identify credit constrained consumers and buffer-stock savers. The results also lend support to 
Carroll’s  (2001)  warning  not  to  estimate  utility  parameters  from  Euler  equations  without 
controlling for buffer-stock saving. Column 3 repeats this estimation for a combined sample 
that includes both constrained and unconstrained consumers. The coefficients for subjective 
mortality rates  and health cost risk  are significant, and results  are similar to the baseline 
regression in column (1). A 1% increase in the subjective mortality rate is now associated 
with a decline of 1.72% in consumption growth. 
Column 4 of Table 5 replicates the baseline estimation for a different  measure of 
consumption growth, the percentage change of at home food consumption. Due to a lack of 
better data, previous studies have often resorted to food consumption as a proxy for total 
household consumption (Browning and Lusardi 1996). The effect of subjective mortality rates 
on  at  home  food  consumption  growth  is  slightly  negative  at  -.09,  but  not  significantly 
different from zero, as opposed to -1.98 in the baseline regression. This result adds further 
evidence  to  the  argument  that  food  consumption  is  not  additively  separable  from  other 
nondurable  consumption  goods,  and  is  therefore  not  a  good  proxy  for  nondurable 
consumption. 
 
C. Alternative specifications of mortality expectations 
Table 6 shows estimation results for various alternative specifications of subjective 
mortality rates. Column 1 includes life table mortality rates instead of subjective mortality 
rates. The point estimate of the coefficient for life table mortality rates is –1.91, which is close   21 
to the coefficient for subjective mortality rates in the baseline regression. However, due to a 
higher standard error the coefficient is now significantly different from zero only at the ten 
percent  level.  The  estimation  coefficient  of  health  cost  risk  is  similar  to  the  baseline 
regression.  The  R
2  of  0.026  in  the  estimation  based  on  life  table  mortality  rates  is  also 
somewhat lower than the R
2 of 0.035 based on subjective mortality rates.  This result is in 
accordance with the finding in Gan, Gong, Hurd, and McFadden  (2004) that the explanatory 
power of subjective mortality rates on intertemporal consumption choice is higher than for life 
table mortality rates. 
Column 2 of Table 6 replaces the mortality rate with the individual specific mortality 
factor, which measure deviations between life table mortality rates and subjective mortality 
expectations. I find that a higher individual mortality factor has a significant negative impact 
on consumption growth. This result shows that the effect of subjective mortality rates on 
consumption growth is not just driven by cohort effects. 
Column 3 excludes 37 observations with subjective longevity expectations of 100% 
from  the  sample.  This  permits  testing  whether  the  estimation  results  are  driven  by  focal 
values. The result shows that estimation results are in essence unchanged after the exclusion 
of focal answers. Column 4 includes 53 observations with a subjective longevity expectation 
of  zero.  As  discussed  in  section  3,  subjective  annual  mortality  rates  cannot  be  easily 
calculated  for  respondents  with  a  zero  longevity  expectations.  So  far,  I  excluded  these 
observations  from  the  sample.  In  column  4,  I  assume  that  respondents  who  stated  their 
subjective longevity probability as zero have in fact a subjective longevity probability of 0.01, 
which allows me to calculate subjective annual mortality rates. The estimated coefficient of 
the subjective mortality rate on consumption growth now declines from -1.98 in the baseline 
regression to    -0.85, which is still significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Several 
possible  explanations  could  account  for  the  change  in  the  estimation  results.  First,  focal   22 
answers might not reflect respondents’ actual expectations. The average calculated annual 
subjective  mortality  rate  for  agents  who  report  a  zero  longevity  probability  is  20.7% 
compared to 3.6% for the baseline sample. Actual mortality expectations of focal respondents 
might be lower. Another possible explanation is that respondents who give focal answers to 
survey questions differ in their risk aversion and consumption and saving behavior from other 
agents, which could explain different estimation results.  
 
D. Heterogeneous time and risk preferences    
Table 7 shows regression results for alternative levels of stated preferences, which 
allows calculating relative risk aversion and time discount rates separately for agents with 
different  levels  of  stated  risk  aversion  and  different  financial  planning  horizons.  The 
regression specification in column 1 is the same as for the baseline regression. However, the 
sample is restricted to the 254 respondents whose response to a survey question about the 
willingness to accept an income gamble points towards low risk tolerance (that is high risk 
aversion).  The  coefficient  of  the  subjective  mortality  rate  of  -1.34  is  smaller  than  in  the 
baseline regression in absolute value terms. The lifecycle model predicts that the effect of 
subjective  mortality  rates  on  lower  consumption  growth  should  be  smaller  for  more  risk 
adverse agents.  
The regression specification in column 2 of Table 7 is as before, but the sample is now 
comprised of 117 respondents whose answers to the income gamble question point towards 
higher than average risk tolerance (that implies low risk aversion).  As the theory predicts, the 
coefficient of subjective mortality rate of -3.32 is now higher than in the baseline regression. 
The estimation shown in column 3 is based on the same sample as the baseline regression, but 
includes two additional binary variables, which take the value of one for respondents, whose 
financial planning horizon is either between 1 and 5  years or  greater than five  years. As   23 
compared to the omitted reference group that includes respondents with a financial planning 
horizon of one year or less, the average consumption growth rate increases by 3.3% for agents 
with a medium planning horizon, and by 13.3% for agents with a long financial planning 
horizon.  Theory  implies  that  consumption  growth  is  higher  for  agents  with  lower  time 
discount  rates.  My  results  indicate  that  respondents  who  report  longer  financial  planning 
horizons in survey questions have lower time discount factors, and also that the time discount 
rates vary substantially between persons.  
 
E. Sensitivity analysis    
The estimation shown in column 1 of Table 8 is identical to column 3 of Table 7 
except for the inclusion of additional explanatory variables for income, total assets, good 
health,  and  changes  in  ADL  limitations.  As  discussed  in  section  3,  I  am  concerned  that 
financial planning horizon, which I use as a proxy for time discount rates, is also related to 
determinants of longevity, such as income, wealth, and health. Therefore, I test whether the 
estimation  coefficients  are  sensitive  to  the  inclusion  of  these  variables.  I  also  test  if 
consumption growth is dependent on changes in ADL limitations. The results show that none 
of  the  additional  variable  coefficients  are  significantly  different  from  zero,  and  that  the 
estimated coefficients for subjective mortality rates, financial planning horizon and health 
cost risk do not change.  
In  column  2  of  Table  8,  the  effect  of  health  cost  risk  on  consumption  growth  is 
estimated separately for agents with financial wealth below the median in the sample and 
above the median in the sample. Theory predicts that health cost risk should have a stronger 
impact on the consumption variance of people with low financial wealth than for people with 
high financial wealth, because financial wealth provides a cushion against negative health cost 
shocks. I find indeed that health cost risk has a stronger impact on consumption growth for   24 
individuals  with  below  median  wealth  than  for  people  with  above  median  wealth.  The 
estimation  coefficient  of  subjective  mortality  rates  is  almost  unchanged  compared  to  the 
baseline estimation. 
 
F. Estimated time discount rates and relative risk aversion parameters    
The final step in my analysis is to calculate utility parameters of time discount rates 
and relative risk aversion parameters from the regression results in tables 5 and 7. Based on 
the regression coefficients relative risk aversion parameters can be calculated according to 
equation 7, and time discount factors according to equation 8. Both equations are discussed in 
section 3. For calculating time discount rates separately by financial planning horizon, I add 
the coefficient of the relevant financial planning horizon category to the constant. Average 
relative risk aversion calculated from the baseline regression (Table 5, column 1) is 0.50. The 
inter-quartile  range  of  the  relative  risk  aversion  parameter,  which  I  calculated  using  a 
bootstrap with 200 repetitions, ranges from 0.40 to 0.65. Risk aversion in the sample with 
high stated risk aversion (Table 7, column 1) is 0.74, and in the sample with low stated risk 
aversion (Table 7, column 2) it is 0.30. Time discount rates can be calculated if the real 
interest is known. I assume a real interest rate of 3%, which corresponds to a long run average 
of real interest rates for long term U.S. government bonds. Then the average time discount 
rate (calculated from Table 5, column 1) is 0.043, with an inter-quartile range from 0.031 to 
0.061. For agents with a short financial planning horizon the time discount rate is given by 
0.079, as compared to 0.060 for agents with medium financial planning horizon and 0.003 for 
agents with high a long financial planning horizon. The estimates of time discount rates and 
relative risk aversion parameters are also shown in Table 9.  
How do these parameter estimates compare to the previous literature? The only study 
known to the author that uses subjective mortality rates to estimate utility parameters is Gan,   25 
Gong, Hurd, and McFadden. (2004). They estimate a relative risk aversion parameter of 0.98, 
which is closest to my estimate for the most risk averse group, and a time discount rate of 
0.058, which is close to my estimate for the group with a medium financial planning horizon. 
Other studies that estimate relative risk aversion parameters from life table mortality rates 
tend to estimate higher values of relative risk aversion, that range from  1.08 (Hurd 1989), to 
2.1 (Skinner 1985), 3 (Palumbo 1999), to 8.2 (De Nardi, French, and Jones 2005).  
 
5 Conclusion 
In summary, I find that information about subjective mortality rates, and time and risk 
preferences  elicited  from  survey  questions  can  help  to  better  understand  the  saving  and 
consumption  behavior  of  the  elderly.  The  main  findings  are:  First,  consumption  growth 
decreases with higher subjective mortality rates, which is consistent with the predictions of 
the  lifecycle  model.  Second,  estimated  utility  parameters  vary  with  answers  to  survey 
questions about the respondents’ financial planning horizon and willingness to accept income 
gambles,  which  indicates  that  answers  to  survey  questions  can  contain  meaningful 
information about time and risk preferences. Third, I find substantial variation in estimated in 
estimated risk aversion parameters and time discount rates. Relative risk aversion is estimated 
to be two and a half times higher (0.74 as compared to 0.3) for agents with high stated risk 
aversion than for agents with low stated risk aversion. Estimated time discount rates vary 
from 0.3% for agents with the longest financial planning horizon to 7.9% for agents with the 
shortest financial planning horizons. These results indicate that heterogeneous preferences 
play a role in explaining the consumption and saving behaviors of the elderly.  
There are many questions open for future research. One topic for future research could 
be to quantify the effects of heterogeneous preferences on wealth holdings and on explaining 
differences in wealth levels. Another topic could be to expand the analysis to married couples   26 
and  to  examine  the  effect  of  mortality  expectations  of  both  spouses  on  intertemporal 
consumption choices of couple households.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Estimating consumption growth      
Consumption growth  -0.059  0.502 
Food consumption growth (N= 336)  0.034  0.511 
Subjective mortality  0.036  0.037 
Pessimism factor  1.041  1.029 
Life table mortality  0.043  0.029 
Health cost risk (in 1,000,000)   180.237  314.887 
Age  75.264  6.489 
Male  0.196  0.398 
Years of education  12.409  2.783 
Income (in $1,000)  29.259  38.443 
Total assets (in $1.000)  248.002  332.136 
Good health  2.541  1.034 
ADL change  0.037  0.591 
Low risk aversion   0.319  0.466 
High risk averion  0.681  0.466 
Short financial planning horizon  0.351  0.477 
Medium financial planning horizon  0.336  0.473 
Long financial planning horizon  0.312  0.464 
Intention spend all (N = 418)  0.112  0.316 
Number of observations  
(baseline estimation) 
         371   
     
Estimating health cost risk      
Out of pocket payment (in $)  3,788.81  15,012.62 
Previous Out of pocket payment (in $)  2,264.35  6,040.85 
Age  67.387  10.454 
Years of education  12.129  3.335 
Male   0.408  0.491 
Good health  0.744  0.435 
Employer health insurance  0.543  0.498 
Private health insurance  0.183  0.387 
Medicaid  0.082  0.275 
No health insurance  0.050  0.219 
Financial wealth (in $1,000)  113.673  437.104 
Income (in $1,000)  54.375  104.496 
ADL limitations  0.298  0.857 
Diabetes  0.145  0.352 
Cancer  0.111  0.314 
Lung disease  0.079  0.269 
Heart disease  0.217  0.412 
Stroke  0.069  0.254 
Psychological disorder  0.133  0.340 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics by financial planning horizon 
 
  Short financial 
planning horizon 
(N = 130) 
Medium financial 
planning horizon 
(N = 125) 
Long financial 
planning horizon 
(N = 116) 






















































Table 3: Descriptive statistics by risk aversion based on income gamble question 
 
  Low risk aversion 
(N = 117) 
High risk aversion 
(N = 254) 
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Table 4: Variance of out of pocket medical expenditure 
 
 




st stage  
error 
(2) 
Previous out of pocket payment  0.403***  0.04*** 
  (0.019)  (0.015) 
Age  72.773***  -1.949 
  (12.816)  (9.973) 
Years of education  155.614***  48.791 
  (38.595)  (30.035) 
Male  -384.05*  118.989 
  (232.765)  (181.137) 
Good health  -621.619**  -489.988** 
  (302.624)  (235.501) 
Employer health insurance  -74.869  78.092 
  (318.152)  (247.585) 
Private health insurance  837.454**  78.192 
  (353.474)  (275.072) 
Medicaid  -2,045.64***  22.82 
  (466.492)  (363.023) 
No health insurance  544.093  34.661 
  (583.747)  (454.270) 
Financial wealth (in $1000)  0.388  0.033 
  (0.310)  (0.024) 
Income (in $1000)  -0.467  -0.867 
  (1.333)  (1.037) 
ADL limitations  812.358***  -51.153 
  (148.767)  (115.770) 
Diabetes  439.465  -144.19 
  (329.110)  (256.113) 
Cancer  742.387**  -67.372 
  (361.264)  (281.135) 
Lung disease  -413.817  -289.935 
  (426.789)  (332.126) 
Heart disease  648.529**  325.766 
  (290.909)  (226.385) 
Stroke  1,547.69***  253.784 
  (464.668)  (361.603) 
Psychological disorder  288.257  -177.488 
  (346.609)  (269.730) 
Observations  17095  17095 
R-squared  0.05  0.001 
Huber- White standard errors in brackets 









   31 



















Subjective mortality  -1.986***  0.195  -1.729***  -0.091 
  (0.701)  (1.379)  (0.652)  (0.835) 
Health cost risk  0.0002**  -0.0001  0.0002**  0.0002* 
  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Observations         371         47        418         336 
R-squared  0.04  0.01  0.03         0.01 
Huber-White standard errors in brackets   





























(with 0%  
 answer) 
(4) 
Subjective mortality      -1.857**  -0.854* 
      [0.742]  [0.444] 
Life table mortality  -1.917*       
  [1.997]       
Pessimism factor    -0.043*     
    [0.024]     
Health cost risk  0.0002**  0.0002**  0.0002*  0.0002** 
  [0.0001]  [0.0001]  [0.0001]  [0.0001] 
Observations  371  371  326  424 
R-squared  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.02 
Huber-White standard errors in brackets 
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Subjective mortality  -1.348*  -3.328**  -1.767** 
  [0.788]  [1.442]  [0.700] 
Health cost risk  0.0001  0.0003  0.0002 
  [0.0001]  [0.0002]  [0.0001]** 
Medium financial planning horizon      0.033 
      [0.067] 
Long financial planning horizon      0.133 
      [0.057]** 
Observations  254  117  371 
R-squared  0.02  0.07  0.06 
Huber-White standard errors in brackets 
















Subjective mortality  -1.958**  -1.917** 
  (0.722)  (0.700) 
Health cost risk  0.0002**   
  (0.0001)   
Health cost risk (low wealth)    0.0003* 
    (0.0001) 
Health cost risk (high wealth)    0.0001 
    (0.0001) 
Income (in $1000)  -0.0003   
  (0.0005)   
Total assets (in $ 1000)  0.00004   
  (0.00008)   
Good health  0.018   
  (0.092)   
ADL change  0.067   
  (0.054)   
Observations  371  371 
R-squared  0.06  0.05 
Huber- White standard errors in brackets 
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Table 9: Estimated time discount rates and relative risk aversion parameters 
 
Estimated relative risk aversion parameters   






Full sample  0.503  0.404 – 0.658 
High stated risk aversion  0.741  0.517 – 1.112 
Low stated risk aversion  0.300  0.226 – 0.401 
     
Estimated time discount rates     






Full sample  0.043  0.031 – 0.061 
Short financial planning horizon   0.079  0.054 – 0.114 
Medium financial planning horizon   0.060  0.040 – 0.096 
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Figure 1: Distribution of subjective mortality rates and life table mortality rates 
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